Military
tokenism
Malaysia oftens hits out at Singapore's "low
number" of Malay national service officers;
alll the while its own de facto policy was to recruit non-Malays
as token, says Malaysian commentator MGG Pillai
Nov 10, 2002
The
Royal Malaysian Navy Chief, Admiral Ramly Abu Bakar, who
is where he is because he is a Malay, now finds it politic,
now that he has reached the top of his line, to plead for
more non-Malays to join the armed forces.
But he, like the other generals who now spout the obvious,
during their long career in the armed forces, did little
to ensure they are.
It is official policy not to allow non-Malays into the armed
forces, except as a
token: in the first flush of the political arrangements
after the 13 May, 1969 racial riots, the token non-Malay
became official policy and enforced in vengeance.
Only two non-Malay police officers were taken in the first
recruitment after the
riots. It has not improved by much.
In the latest naval recruitment, of 645 recruits, only 50
were non-Malays. The ratio of four Malays to one Malay in
the civil service became, in time, eight-to-one and wider.
The non-Malay was reduced to a token.
The army, for instance, allowed for only three generals
amongst the Indians and the Chinese: one major-general and
two brigadier-generals.
This rule is varied only if these officers would convert
to Islam; if they do, they would be promoted as Malay officers.
This
is so in every branch of government: two or three non-Malay
secretaries-general in the civil servive, two or three federal
court judges, two or three senior police officers.
No matter how good or competent, none can aspire to be top
of the heap. That is not allowed.
So, the only Chinese and Indians who opted for government
service, over the years, were not the best but those who
opted for comfort and a good pension and were prepared to
be pushed around.
That is not a good pool from which to select the tokens
at the highest level.
Besides, to prove sub-consciously the non-Malays are not
any good, they are often selected for their incompetence
and unreliability.
Look at the recent appointments to the judiciary: many were
selected for their judicial competence or standing as lawyers,
but to fill the numbers any way they could so these judges
would not upset the political apple cart.
Some turn out to be excellent, but that is the exception
than the rule. As in every branch of government.
When
non-Malays know they are not wanted, why should they demean
themselves to be knocked out before they start, and be more
and more frustrated as they rise, if at all, up the ladder?
No amount of recruiting drives would raise the non-Malay
numbers in the armed forces if the official worldview denies
the non-Malay his due because he is not Malay and, increasingly,
not Muslim.
This cannot change. Not now. This entrenched and domineering
Malay and Islamic politico-religious cabal would not allow
non-Malays and Malays who believe in non-Malay advancement
to be promoted.
They terrorise cabinet ministers and senior civil servants
into cowed silence. As generals in the armed forces.
The government, therefore, would not -- and cannot -- address
it. Nor the armed forces.
It once had a chief who insisted upon running the armed
forces on Islamic lines, and no general or cabinet minister,
not even the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, who heads
the armed forces council, could -- or would dare -- interfere.
In short, this Malay-only policy is so entrenched, in all
walks of government -- I dare say, Malaysian life -- that
nothing short of a revolution could reverse it.
This
Malay-only policy brought with it an officially encouraged
mediocrity. Everything is reduced to the lowest common denominator.
Where meritocracy should hold, it is ignored. In schools
and universities, this view is encouraged.
Look at the appointment of professors. The non-Malays, however
good, are ignored if there is a pool of mediocre Malays
who could be promoted.
When universities had a high reputation for both independence
and scholarship, and not enough Malays yet who could pitch
in, the government removed both.
Undergraduates are not encouraged to think. If they did,
they could run into trouble.
Nothing short of sycophantic praise for the government would
lead an undergraduate into unnecessary trouble.
English fell by the wayside as lectures in Malay were based
on badly translated
standard texts, that most graduates from Malaysian universities
could not even converse in English.
The decline of English in universities, while it has other
political and cultural causes, highlighted the mediocrity
the government encouraged.
For
when the aim is to entrench one group or race even when
they are not ready, mediocrity must rule. It was also to
punish.
The political overview after the 13 May riots and Malay
dominance was to punish the non-Malay for daring to confront
the Malay to defend the rights promised him after independence.
As usual, when the Malays reacted, the non-Malay collapsed.
And did not
challenge this deliberate worldview in which they were officially
relegated to irrelevance.
This Malay dominance led to the policies that Admiral Ramly
now worries about.
Let us look at industry. The Proton car, for instance. The
Chinese are deliberately excluded from it, except peripherally
as an adjunct to the Malay stake holder.
The workers are, like the civil service, predominantly Malay.
The non-Malay who has a brilliant idea can only make it
to the market place if he has a Malay
partner, whose share he often has to pay, acceptable to
the government.
It has become so bad that many just move to, usually, Thailand,
and make his fortune there.
A key figure in the motor industry in Thailand is a Malaysian
Chinese, who went
there after he was rebuffed in Malaysia.
It
takes 30 years for a policy to fruit. It could have far
better than it has if the government had fine-tuned it,
as Singapore does, so the policy is always relevant; and
changes made to policy so that the distanced non-Malay could
be brought into the system.
It did not. It decided the policy is writ in stone and should
not, under any circumstances, be amended.
All it did was to alienate not just the Malays, who find
themselves paradoxically hobbled more than the disadvantaged
non-Malay - but the country as well.
The cultural and political resentment is not limited to
the non-Malay. The Malay is, too. And now, while the Malay
has all he wants, he is thoroughly dissatisfied with his
lot.
The
new generation of Malays has more in common with the Chinese
and Indians than he has with his Malay-dominated government.
For all three have nothing in common with the government
run in their name. The government does not address this
problem, indeed does not any problem, and believes that
promises made off the cuff should redress it.
It does not. Now, the government finds must reject the very
policy of Malay
dominance that now haunts it. But it is damned if it does,
and damned if it does not.
(The writer is a Malaysia political commentator who operates
a website, www.mggpillai.com.)