Indonesia
Dangers of a plit-up
Indonesia is a giant in torment. Singapore must prepare for its possible break-up. By Seah Chiang Nee
Oct 26, 2000

An earthquake, with a magnitude of 6.5 on the Richter scale, hit West Java when I was writing this piece and some high-rise buildings in Singapore felt the tremors. It was, of course, not the first time that Singaporeans had felt the impact of an Indonesian quake.

It won't be the last, either. It was one of Nature's frequent reminders to Singaporeans that they cannot escape the reverberation if a major upheaval were to happen in Indonesia.

For the last couple of years, the Republic has been worried about the possibility of Indonesia breaking up - or breaking down.

On Jan 1, Indonesia will begin to devolve power over hundreds of provinces and districts, giving them a degree of political and economic autonomy to save the vast archipelago from breaking up.

It is an important development. For two years, Singaporeans have been watching and hoping that its large neighbour will not break down - or break up.

All countries, near and far, have a strong interest in seeing Indonesia whole and stable - not go the way of the Soviet Union, or worse still, bloodily like Yugoslavia. For its Asean neighbours, it would be a regional disaster. Entrepot Singapore could be the hardest hit.

Despite all the good intentions, Singapore's worst nightmare may still happen.

The world's fourth most populous nation is faced with a long list of troubles stemming from its rising poverty and spreading unemployment - religious and ethnic violence, blatant corruption and anarchy. In addition, Jakarta is still unable to exert authority over the armed forces or police or judiciary and - yes, secessionism.

Any one of them could break up a country smaller than Indonesia.

And behind all this mess is the black influence - as the government believes - of the Suharto family, which appears too extensive to destroy.

Let me write a little about Indonesians at large. In the three decades that I have reported the country, I have found most Indonesians - if they can be generalised - to be friendly, humble although less sophisticated than the Malays in Malaysia.

But their country's size has given them more confidence than their neighbour. Whether Javanese or Sumatrans, Sulawesians or Balinese, Indonesians are by nature rather gentle people but capable of extreme violence.

Even in the best of times, it is difficult for Jakarta to rule this archipelago that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Its people speak 250 languages and dialects.

Because of its size, it is under-reported. Like in other big countries, the world media seldom reaches beyond the gates of major cities.

This means that a lot of things are happening in the country that even Jakarta does not know about.

For me it also means that events can break suddenly, unpredictably, in remote places and spread very quickly before the outside world realises it. So Singapore and Asean, be careful.

Unless, the government in Jakarta can suddenly find its form and capability, it is unlikely the present culture of anarchy and rebellion can be easily reversed - and Indonesia, in its present form, will follow the way (at least partially) of the Soviet Union in the next few years.

I cannot think of a more sensitive way of putting it.

Friends who wish it well are hopeful that firstly, Indonesia will have enough nationalism and pragmatism to come through the present crises as one united country, but secondly, if a break-up has to take place, then it should happen over the conference table and not on the battlefield.

If history in Eastern Europe is to be the judge, it does not augur well for a united Indonesia. In particular when looking at the old Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

These were once big countries kept together by tight central control. In the Soviet Union, that force was the Communist Party which kept all the rebellious republics in check, while in Yugoslavia, it was the late President Tito's iron fist that did it.

As soon as the Soviet Communist Party disintegrated and President Tito died, they broke up - the Soviet Union, peacefully into 15 different pieces and Yugoslavia, after years of bloody ethnic wars, into four parts.

In the same way, it was strong-armed Suharto who kept Indonesia in one piece. Secessionist ambitions were harshly dealt with - not unlike in cold-war Eastern Europe. So were ethnic and religious troublemakers throughout the length and breadth of Indonesia.

Now under a weak, fragile civilian government replacing him, these divergent forces have been released and there is no one capable of putting them back under rein.

That's the reason why I fear the worse case scenario may become a reality.

Already the loss of East Timor, although inevitable, is already providing encouragement to other regions long fighting for independence. They know the army has been weakened.

The worst spots are Aceh, Papua West Timor and Maluku, the scene of an ongoing Muslim-Christian war that has drawn in the army and police.

There are also separatist feelings in the oil-rich provinces of Riau and East Kalimantan in Borneo and dissatisfaction in parts of Sulawesi and even the popular tourist site of Bali.

In West Kalimantan, dayaks and Malays are fighting. But it is Aceh that poses the greatest threat to the wholeness of the Indonesian nation.

To prevent secessions, the central government has changed the constitution to decentralise powers, giving its 26 provinces a bigger share of their revenue and political autonomy from January 1, 2001.

Explained former Finance Minister Bambang Sudibyo. "We are in the process of rotting and, if we don't do something (like this), we will break up."

In a recent interview, the Indonesian Defence Minister, Mr Mohamad Mahfud, blamed any possible break-up on the West's human rights pressure on Indonesia. "We still believe things can be brought under control. But we have a problem.

"We want to exercise our sovereignty, but the international community is singling us out as violators of human rights. In the past three years the international community has been dictating to us a lot. We must keep our sovereignty," he added.

Can Jakarta succeed? It depends on the collective capability of the leadership elite and armed forces, able to work together. So far, the signs are bad. The first priority is for the various leaders to stop fighting one another.

Some Indonesians believe that if the leaders are incapable, disunited, and unable to control the vast territory, then it is better for long-term peace and efficiency to make Indonesia a loose confederation, and failing that, a peaceful break-up. These would be preferable to prolonged civil wars.

For Singapore, the bad points are follow:

· It will break-up Singapore's biggest and most important trading partner in Southeast Asia.

· It could also lead to the creation of a number smaller bitterly quarrelling states and a period of instability in the region, including one or two that are led by ethnic or religious extremists or which harbour anti-Singapore or anti-Chinese feelings.

At present the Jakarta government may not be in total control, but at least it is moderate, and a trier, in good Asean partner.

· The effect could be worse if it unleashes a series of civil wars that may undermine foreign investment, threaten international shipping through the Straits of Malacca and send large numbers of refugees to Singapore and Malaysia.

If, however, it were to take place, the possible advantages are:

· A smaller, easier-to-govern Indonesia, more efficiently run and able to contribute more to the region.

· If the smaller spin-off states can cooperate with one another, adopt moderate policies and concentrate on development, the whole region can even benefit from it.

How will an autonomous (let alone independent) Riau islands affect Singapore and its huge investments in Batam or the proposed gas and water projects? Or the Growth Triangle. Will it lead to better prospects for closer cooperation or worse? All these pros and cons remain a distant theoretical debate.

It is too early to speculate whether or not this will happen, let alone whether it will be good or bad for Singapore or the region.

But if it leads to a violent confrontation for independence, an unlikely event, then the Growth Triangle will be badly affected.

Indonesia was probably one of the urgent reasons that drove Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to his first visit to KL in 10 years to meet Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Both countries have much to fear from any breakdown or breakup of Indonesia.

They are likely to be driven closer together in shared concern over the issue, which continues to cast the longest shadow over their stock markets and the level of foreign investment into the region.

At the moment, chances of a break-up are growing, but it is not yet inevitable. The biggest responsibility of it not happening rests with the armed forces acting cohesively, firmly and responsibly under the elected civilian government.

Seah Chiang Nee