Lee Hsien Loong interview
Singapore's Big Gamble
Will he be where he is today without his father. With FP Editor Moisés Naím.
June 17, 2002

One of the world's most globalised nations. Its most trade-intensive economy. Its busiest port. Holder of the Guinness Book of World Records title for the longest human dominoes. A "little red dot." An "irritating pimple that refuses to burst." "Disneyland with capital punishment."

Singapore has won more than its share of bouquets and brickbats. Why has this 646-square-kilometer city-state of 4.1 million people attracted such outsized attention?

Start with former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. After Singapore's debut as an independent state in 1965, Lee force-marched his "digits" -- his term for Singapore's citizens -- through the hoops of economic and social progress.

Under Lee's leadership, an ever watchful state also regimented almost
every aspect of Singaporean life and snuffed out sparks of political dissent, making Singapore the poster child for "soft" authoritarianism.

The rewards: a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and living standards with few rivals in Asia, let alone the rest of the world, and a shimmering reputation for efficiency, enterprise, and economic openness.

Today, however, Lee Kuan Yew is semi-retired, and Singapore is recovering from recession. And there is some question about whether the methods of social and economic engineering that made Singapore a pint-sized global powerhouse can carry it further.

Can economic and technological innovation thrive in a culture known more for producing faithful employees than freewheeling entrepreneurs?

In the Information Age, can a nation maintain high levels of political control without undermining its social and economic potential?

Those questions underlie many of the challenges facing Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Kuan Yew's eldest son and Singapore's likely next prime minister, who spoke with FP Editor Moisés Naím in Singapore earlier this year.

FOREIGN POLICY: Given the global economic slowdown, terrorist attacks, the bursting of the Internet bubble, and more protectionist instincts, is the fast pace of globalisation in the 1990s ever likely to repeat itself?

Lee Hsien Loong: That naive euphoria will not return. The sense that we're all going to become one, that all of the boundaries are going to be lowered, that the water level will equalise everywhere, and that societies will become, basically, like the United States - I don't think that will happen. But I think the
economic and technological pressures pushing toward greater integration, more efficient markets, and more advanced products that need greater and greater economies of scale-whether it's banking services or a new generation of computer chips -- will be there. For countries throughout Asia, if you want to prosper, the way to do it is to plug in more rather than to unplug.

FP: What are the main deficiencies of the current world trading system?

LHL: I think overall the system works quite well. Some blemishes have to be fixed, but they are not easy to fix. We need some discipline to bind all countries to multilateral, impartial rules. We're doing better than before, but no country completely gives up its sovereignty. And specifically, the Americans will hold on to their rights to operate unilaterally and punish people unilaterally. Agriculture is a particular problem.

FP: Why?

LHL: Wealthy countries protect their own farming sectors for political reasons, closing off an avenue that would be a great comparative advantage for countries that export sugar, corn, or cattle. Australia and New Zealand are not the only countries that are upset. Many developing countries see agriculture as an area where they have an opportunity to be competitive, and rich countries have drawn the rules in a way to make that difficult. The textile industry is another such area. It would be much more effective to dismantle the textile restrictions of wealthy countries than to provide foreign aid to developing countries. Also, very poor countries have to feel that they are going to
benefit from negotiations. It is very difficult to have a successful negotiation involving more than 100 countries when India and Egypt, or previously some of the Latin American countries, are unhappy. That is a problem.

FP: What do you think about controls on international flows of money? What would be good examples of capital controls that make sense and are desirable and capital controls that are counterproductive?

LHL: [Laughs.] You will not make me popular with that question. I think it has to be within context.

FP: What about the Malaysian experience with capital controls?

LHL: To be fair, we and many observers did not think the capital controls the Malaysians imposed in September 1998 would work. If the currency is overvalued, and you try to prop it up this way, there are many ways to get around any controls. As it turned out, the economy recovered, and the Malaysian government believes that capital controls had something to do with it. I think, at the very least, you can say that the controls did no harm. And
probably one contributing factor is that after the government imposed capital controls, the rest of the currencies stabilised and strengthened. So the Malaysians were not left high and dry, their exchange rate was not under pressure, and there was no incentive to have a black market. If the yen and the rupiah and the Singapore dollar -- which would have had to flow more or less in
line with our trading partners -- had gone down, I think it would have been more difficult for them, as Hong Kong found when it was left without capital controls.

FP: Do you anticipate a reemergence of obstacles to the free flow of capital?

LHL: Within developed countries, no. It's not possible. The Europeans, the Americans, and the Japanese have trillions of dollars sloshing back and forth, and their economies are robust enough to manage it. But with smaller countries, there will be varying degrees of restrictions. In Singapore, we have no capital controls, but we did have something called a non-internationalisation policy, which had the purpose of making it difficult for a nonresident to borrow Singaporean dollars for noneconomic purposes.

FP: Define that.

LHL: For example, if you wanted to borrow to speculate as opposed to borrowing to invest in Singapore or to do business in Singapore, there were restrictions. We've lifted nearly all of them now.

FP: Countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia yearn to return to their high-growth past-the days of the "tiger" economies. But in varying degrees, they are all reluctant to take difficult measures to retool their economies. In some quarters, this reluctance fuels further pessimism about the future of East Asia. Is this pessimism justified?

LHL: I think these countries need time to sort out their problems. The South Koreans have probably made the most progress, although not without pain. The other countries are each doing it their own way and taking longer. Some of them, particularly Indonesia, have political or security problems that are
preoccupying their governments and that must be addressed before they can sort out their economies.

FP: Were you more optimistic about the region in the mid-1990s
than you are today?

LHL: Yes.

FP: And what changed that?

LHL: Well, first, we ran into a disaster.

FP: You mean the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998?

LHL: Yes. Some people say the disaster was waiting to happen. I think the disaster was made worse by the way it was handled.

FP: Handled by whom?

LHL: By the governments and, to some extent, by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at the beginning. The international financial institutions consulted with us because nobody quite understood the full consequences. Certainly, we did not believe that Indonesia needed to go through such traumatic years, which it has since 1997 and 1998. So the Asian crisis is the first reason why I'm less optimistic. The second is that you need a degree of confidence and a certain global image of being a place with hope and with a future. The fundamentals in Southeast Asia haven't changed so much, but the image has changed completely. For executives, fund managers, and people who are looking for a place to put something-not just money, but a
project-the image has changed. And now people say, "Well, there is no hope in this region," which I think is as wrong as the earlier overly optimistic assessment of Southeast Asia. That image problem is difficult to overcome.

FP: Are you part of the camp that believes the recovery came too quickly to the region and that it therefore allowed some countries-notably South Korea and Thailand-to postpone needed reforms?

LHL: Well, the recovery took the pressure off them. But even if you put more pressure, people will not necessarily be convinced that they must do the rational thing. They may become very angry, and it may become politically impossible to fix the problem. Just look at Japan, where the economy has been bumbling along for 10 years. I'm not a believer in inflicting pain in order to solve problems. But once in a while, pain will come, and if that helps to educate people, so be it. That's what is happening to us now.

FP: You have had a ringside view of Japan's astonishing economic decline over the past decade. The generalised view is that Japan simply lacks the political will to reform; that politics, not economics, is the most important factor; and that it will take nothing short of a major political transformation, almost a
revolution, to change Japan's declining economic fortunes. And some people say that Japan's experience is a parable about the hazards of a one-party system. Do you agree, for example, that if Japan had a more competitive party system, that if the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had less of a grip over politics, Japan would have been able to push through real reforms?

LHL: I think that's too simple. The Japanese have had coalition governments that had no greater success in changing the system than LDP governments. The problem is that Japanese politicians, whether LDP or otherwise, have become too closely associated with vested interests. They depend on the farm vote, on the construction industry, and on securing special privileges so that
their constituencies will reelect them. The system of patronage goes all the way down to every Diet member, including contributions at the weddings and funerals of their constituents. And that system has become entrenched in politics, and it cannot be changed. Even if Japan had a different set of ministers in charge, I don't think the system could change that easily because
the civil service, which runs a lot of the policies, is tremendously inert and has an ability to outlast and out-know the ministers.

I also think that for real change to occur, a major economic upheaval-not just a political decision-has to happen. Companies have to go bust, and banks have to go bust. New sources of enterprise and vitality and profits are necessary. And that's not something that will happen overnight. It is possible to do it on a small scale, as the Americans did after the savings and loan crisis, when they sold stuff at any price through the Resolution Trust Corporation. Some people were wiped out. But on an economy-wide basis, is that really possible?

FP: Is China going to experience major upheaval and political turmoil in the next five years?

LHL: I'm not betting on it. As far as policies are concerned, there is a consensus that reform and modernisation are the way to go. The Chinese have committed to the World Trade Organisation. A new generation of leaders, which they will elect this year, will follow that path. And I think the old generation will find some way to look over their shoulders. They have quite serious problems with state-run enterprises, with corruption, and with managing the process of change, which is very fast. But I don't expect a complete collapse. China is not like Russia.

FP: Over the last half-century, the U.S. military presence has been welcomed by many Asian governments, not least in Singapore, as an important force for stability. Do you think the United States is more or less welcome in the region after September 11, 2001?

LHL: I don't think the United States is less welcome. The balance of power in Asia has been maintained because after the Second World War and Vietnam, the Americans stayed in the region. The 7th Fleet and the Pacific Command in Hawaii are really the sheriff. They're part of the framework that has allowed many Asian countries to grow and develop. These countries know that if you want to solve the terrorist problem, you need to work with the Americans here.

FP: Before September 11, there was considerable grumbling among America's friends and allies about the Bush administration's plans to push ahead with national missile defense, to scrap the antiballistic missile treaty, to abandon the Kyoto Protocol, and to reject the International Criminal Court. Some critics went so far as to suggest that the United States was the world' s real "rogue state." Do you think the Bush administration has this unilateralist stripe?

LHL: I don't think it's helpful to criticise the Bush administration. It came in with definite ideas of what it wanted to do on a number of issues, and it set about to do those things. But as the administration went ahead, it found that the world is
not quite as amenable as it might have imagined-which every administration does-and it has had to adjust. September 11 has hastened that process.

FP: Let me ask you about one particular area of U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration, one source of discontinuity: the Korean peninsula, where the current administration has taken a much tougher stance toward talks with
the North Koreans than its predecessor. What's your view on the preferred course of action?

LHL:The new administration is entitled to a new view. But if you have to change course, then you really should try to do it in a way that doesn't hurt your allies. In this case, I think the South Koreans felt that they had been left stranded when the Americans suddenly changed course. And that's a high price to pay, one that might have been avoided.

THE SINGAPORE MODEL

FP: The Chinese say that in terms of sequencing their political and economic reforms, they look at Russia to decide what not to do and at Singapore to decide what to do. They think it was wrong for Russia to liberalise politics and economics simultaneously with glasnost and perestroika. Instead, they look at Singapore, with its very liberal economy and much less liberal political system, and think that is the way to go.

LHL: They look at many models, and our circumstances are not the same as theirs. We discuss the suitability of the Singapore model with them from time to time, and they always say, "Adapt it to Chinese national conditions." Meaning what works in Singapore may or may not work in China. That's quite understandable. I mean, we are 4.1 million people, while they' re 1.3 billion.

FP: What about Singapore will not work in China? Give us an example.

LHL: We can say to our citizens, "Stop littering or we fine you $1,000." And over a few years, people stop littering. In China, with a billion people, you can't do that. [Laughs.] Nothing would happen. But China is finding ways to overcome that city by city, and its cities have now improved considerably from how they used to be.

FP: What makes a Singaporean a Singaporean?

LHL: [Laughs.] That is a challenging question. With the older generation, cultural identity was stronger because many would have been educated in either Chinese or one of the other languages; would have grown up in a not-so-Westernised environment; and to be quite candid, would have had no choice but to live in Singapore. The younger generation's identity is based on growing up here, having friends here, doing national service here, eventually making a home here, and-we hope-developing an attitude that it is part of an enterprise that it is helping to build, that it has influenced, and that is unique. Singapore may look like London or New York or Munich, but it isn't. It's different. It's in a different part of the world altogether.

FP: Singapore is a multicultural society. For many people, the ultimate indication of integration and cohesion is intermarriage between different groups. Do you see intermarriage between your cultural groups as a goal?

LHL: Between Muslims and non-Muslims? No. I think that's not realistic. The major faiths are all in Singapore-Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. None of these will triumph over any of the others. There is a certain amount of
intermarriage, particularly between the Chinese and the Indians. And there is some intermarriage with the Malays and the Muslims, too, but not in the sense of multireligious families. So I think the distinction between the religions will remain. But we have to manage it. We can't become homogenised. We accept that we will always be not quite identical, but we are all Singaporeans.

FP: In economic terms, Singapore is almost a paragon of globalisation. But in the same way that standards of economic globalisation have been very good for Singapore, there are now emerging standards of political globalisation that Singapore has not embraced to the same degree-for example, democracy, freedom of the press, and individual civil liberties.

LHL: That's mostly liberal rhetoric. If you read the New York Times or if you listen to Amnesty International or the American Civil Liberties Union, they will say that these political and economic standards have to go together for a particular nation to be in good standing. According to them, to prosper you need to follow certain standards, of which they are the arbiters. And even if you don't prosper, that's the right way to do it.

FP: You don't agree?

LHL: Some values command wide acceptance. If you are going to be a banker, there's no such thing as Asian banking values, because you are either a sound banker or not. But if you are managing a society or living in a society, then different societies have different norms, work in different ways, and have different geopolitical circumstances. If you look at Asia, the society that has followed the U.S. model most closely would be the Philippines, because it has had half a century of American tutelage and very close ties. But the Philippine political system doesn't work like the U.S. political system at all. Gen. Douglas
MacArthur tried to impose the model in Japan, and he had almost a blank slate and even wrote a new constitution. But Japan doesn't resemble the United States either.

FP: What is the paramount U.S. norm that doesn't fit Singapore?

LHL: It's really a question of balance between the individual and society. And if you look at a political value, the role of the press in the U.S. political system is something that is unique. The media's role is not even the same in Europe.

FP: Critics say that one weakness of Singapore's controlling culture is that it encourages the emergence of great employees but not entrepreneurs. Are you losing entrepreneurs? Are they leaving?

LHL: There is a flow of talent out as well as in. But our problem with entrepreneurs is not that they have gone overseas. Our problem is that our environment has not encouraged people to become entrepreneurs. They have found other successful careers by working for multinational corporations and working in our government-some people would say we have more than our fair share of talent to run the government and to run the system. And so we don't have the social preconditions or the flow of talent to have a continuous surge of people trying new things, as Taiwan or Hong Kong have, for example. It's a problem. We can change the incentives and the social expectations and norms, but then finally the person has to want to go and do it.

FP: In a June 2000 report, the U.S. Embassy in Singapore stressed that government-linked corporations and state control of Singapore's mass media may pose a significant barrier to government efforts to restructure the economy.

LHL: [Laughs.] The embassy's figures are wrong. The report put government-linked corporations down as two thirds of the economy, when in fact they are about 15 percent, perhaps not even that high. We own certain significant industries and companies-SingTel, the Development Bank of Singapore, Singapore International Airlines, the power industry, the port, the shipyards-because of historical circumstances. We built them into world-class companies. Now, as we look forward, the question is, which should we hold and which no longer make sense? We're looking for opportunities to sell those enterprises that no longer make sense for us to keep.

FP: So you wouldn't mind seeing SingTel being owned by a foreign company?

LHL: I would not rule it out. It depends on the way the industry is going. And if it turns out that SingTel has to be more than a Singaporean company, which is the way the industry has been going, we may have no choice. We'd like to have influence, yes. We'd like SingTel to have a major operation in Singapore. We'd
like Singapore to be a hub. We'd like it to be able to grow as a Singaporean company. But can we do all that? I'm not sure that we can do it in every case.

FP: What about the U.S. embassy's comment that government control of Singapore's mass media may make it harder to restructure the economy?

LHL: No, I don't think so. Newspapers and TV stations aren't a big chunk of the GDP. Newspapers earn less than $1 billion per year, that's 1 percent of the GDP. The TV network earns $50 million a year, which is nothing. So it's not an economic issue. The question is whether we will open up and have a mass-media industry like in the Philippines or in the United States. That's unlikely to happen. I think there will be competition. Other players will come in. We believe it's good to have the TV network and the newspapers take the Singaporean point of view. It's not just the economics of the media business.

FP: Many people would say that what you call a Singaporean point of view is your government's point of view.

LHL: Well, there are a lot of American analysts of the region who find it worth their while to visit the Straits Times Web site to find out what's happening. And there are a lot of Singaporeans who, if they didn't believe the Straits Times, could go onto the Web and read the New York Times or the International Herald Tribune. They can get it on broadband. I do that every morning, after reading the Straits Times.

FP: Looking at the media in Singapore, Australian political scientist Garry Rodan wrote in 2000 that, "Government strategies for constraining critical reporting have resulted in the widespread adoption of self-censorship within all forms of the international media. Ironically, instead of markets softening the
resolve of authoritarian leaders to obstruct the media, they have softened the resolve of international media organisations to report freely. The threat of restricted access to Singapore's prized media markets in retaliation for critical reporting has been a powerful discipline in producing this result."

LHL: What dark secrets about Singapore have been hidden by this-

FP: Well, if it is true that you are hiding something, we wouldn't know, right?

LHL: [Laughing.] With hundreds of magazines and thousands of journalists and people traveling-half of Singaporeans travel overseas every year-we are hiding secrets, and we have succeeded in intimidating all of the media? What we have been able to do is get the media to report responsibly. If journalists report untruths or if they defame someone, then those journalists have to answer for their actions in court. I think that's entirely reasonable.

FP: According to Singapore's Newsapaper and Printing Presses Act, the minister for communication and information can limit the local circulation of international newspapers deemed to be "engaging in the domestic politics of Singapore." What kind of questions would I have to ask to provoke the censorship of FOREIGN POLICY magazine in Singapore?

LHL: You can ask any question, and you will fail to provoke any such response. Such a response is necessary when you make a contentious, slanted report and deny us the right of reply. That's all we ask. You make your point, let us make our point, and then let your readers decide. If you've made your point and you say, "No, I won't let you reply," then I must conclude that you are trying to convey a slanted point of view. I think that 's very reasonable. We don't prevent people from expressing whatever they want. In fact, when we restrict the circulation of a magazine, we also make it possible for people to photocopy and distribute the magazine minus advertisements, so that there is full freedom of information, but you will not profit from it.

FP: Let's discuss the political implications. In the midst of a severe economic crisis in 2001, your party secured 75 percent of the popular vote in the last general election. Some people believe that the outcome of any election in Singapore is predictable.

LHL: [Laughs.]

FP: That is, the People's Action Party (PAP) will emerge a winner
because the ruling party provides very little political space to
opposition parties.

LHL: It's not so simple. The vote is completely open. If people didn't want to support us, they have other choices. And Singapore is a very small state. If you antagonize the population, it's not just a local loss. The loss is across the board. And in this case, we received 75 percent of the vote, which is more than we did last time. Last time we received about 60 percent. I think these numbers show that people in a crisis had confidence in the party. They were not going to fool around. They wanted a government that would help them solve their problems.

FP: There were several restrictions placed on the political use of the Internet during last year's parliamentary elections.

LHL: These are just basic safeguards. You can express whatever view you wish. But the Internet is a new medium, and it's a medium where it is not so easy to hold people responsible for what they have said. And if you said something that is untrue or inflammatory, the damage has already been done before any counteraction could be taken. So some rules are necessary. It is
not for lack of Internet space that we don't have effective opposition parties in Singapore. It is because we have brought in to the PAP almost all of the able people who might otherwise have decided to join the opposition.

FP: Do you agree that you have an international image problem? That the view you just expressed-and that you firmly believe-is not shared by others who observe the world and say, "Singapore is great, and it's a great economic place and great place to do business. But they really rule it in a way that is quite authoritarian"?

LHL: There is a certain liberal establishment that wishes that we were different, because we are a counterexample to what they would like the world to be. But we are not trying to be difficult. We are just trying to live the way that resolves our problems and gives us a path forward.

FP: But even your detractors acknowledge your success. Why, then, is the ruling party so insecure about its position? Wouldn't Singapore's polity be strengthened if you encouraged active debate, truly liberalised the local media, and tolerated the development of a strong opposition?

LHL: You say, why not have free and liberal media? I ask you, where have these things led to greater stability and economic growth in Asia? If you read the liberal media, they say, how about the Philippines? I think -- [laughs] -- that's what you call Asia? And they say, "How about South Korea and Taiwan?" But South Korea and Taiwan are in a different situation, and I'm not sure that their own people are completely satisfied with the way it's going. Just look at a recent transcending preoccupation of the Taiwanese media: the sex scandal of this former legislative counsellor or something, with her picture taken through a pinhole camera. And that's what all media are talking about, nothing else. Is that the way we want to be? We don't think so. And I think Singaporeans don't think so.

FP: What about the issue of transparency, the lack of which helped to trigger and deepen the Asian financial crisis, not to mention the recent Enron debacle in the United States?

LHL: We have the most transparent system around.

FP: But your government seems reluctant to open the books on the Government Investment Corporation, even though it is investing billions of dollars of Singaporean taxpayers' money around the world. Reporting on government holding companies like Temasek is also limited and lacking in detail. Government ministers are not required to publicly record their financial interests in investments but only to submit confidential statements to the
prime minister. Don't those policies cut against the grain of your public commitment to the principle of transparency? When you're investing in a bank, wouldn't you like to know the behaviour, financial holdings, and conflicts of interest of the managers of that bank?

LHL: Why should we make it easy for someone to have a go at the Singaporean dollar by making available exactly how much "ammunition" is stacked up on the other side? We have reserves; they are well monitored. We have safeguards and checks and balances within the system that ensure the reserve hasn't disappeared or been mismanaged, but the level of reserves is not one of the things that we publish. Not everything that takes place in government is reported, not in any government. As for the disclosure of assets, I'm not sure that countries that disclose the assets of their political leaders have a better reputation for integrity and probity than we maintain. Corruption
hasn't disappeared in any number of countries with the freest media in the world. We have licked it, not completely, just as every nation has not licked it. First, we pay our officials properly, so they have no incentive to be on the take. And second, if you are on the take, the system will catch you. And we have the political will to punish you, whoever you may be-whether you're a civil servant, a police officer, or a government minister. So I don't think anybody seriously suggests that because we don't publish the ministers' assets, the ministers in
Singapore lack integrity.

FP: Why would it hurt?

LHL: It's a real problem. No one wants the whole world to know what his private balance sheet is. You will deter very many able people from coming in.

THE TIES THAT BIND

FP: Will you be the next prime minister of Singapore?

LHL: That's not for me to decide. The members of parliament must decide whom they have confidence in and the electorate must see whom they support.

FP: Would you like to be prime minister?

LHL: If we are able to do it, I think it's our responsibility.

FP: People who work in family businesses often say, "I have the
choice of doing something else, of course. Nobody forced me into
the family business."

LHL: This is not a family business.

FP: Yes, but I am using family business as a metaphor. The point is that many chief executive officers of family firms were trained from an early age by formidable fathers whom they admired to assume their position. And then reflecting back, they said, "Nobody forced me. I could have become something else. But the circumstances were such that in retrospect, I really did not have
any other alternative."

LHL: [Laughs.] In a general sense, you are right. If I were not the senior minister's son, I could have gone and done many other things outside of Singapore. But because of my family background, if I had gone off and become a mathematician at Cambridge or Harvard or something, I would have felt as if I were letting down my family. Singapore is a country that has nurtured me, given me opportunities, and then I just desert it? Maybe if people do well
they add luster from afar, but they've really opted out.

FP: Do you feel you could have gotten this far in government without being your father's son?

LHL: I think at the beginning, the recognition helps, because people know you and there's an association. Within a few months, if you don't establish yourself as your own person, then your background becomes a minus. And then each time you move up, they will say, "Oh, he's being promoted because he's somebody's son."

FP: But that reflects a very Singaporean perspective. Do you worry, for example, when people say that President Bashir al-Assad of Syria only became president because his father had the post before him or that U.S. President George W. Bush would have never become president were it not for the fact that his father was president? And that you would never have become what you are likely to become -- prime minister of Singapore -- without your father holding that office before you?

LHL: No. I think, on the contrary, if my father were not a senior minister, it would be much easier.

FP: [Laughs.]

LHL: No. I believe so because they will say, "Ah, well, he looks like the old man, but he's not the old man." Whereas if you don't have those connections, you come in on your own merits. Nobody will say that you look like or don't look like your father or that you are temperamentally like or unlike your father. I've
been in politics for 17 years. I've had how many elections? Four? Five elections-1984, 1988, 1991, 1997, and last year. If people thought I am here because of my father and not because of me, I would not have been elected all those times. The voters make an assessment: Are you your own man? Are you going to be able to look after the country? Members of parliament and the ministers need to know whether you are going to be an asset to the team or
whether you will cause them to lose votes. If I am not here meritoriously, it's not just going to hurt me, it's going to hurt the whole PAP and government. And you can't govern Singapore successfully without the support of the members of parliament and the population. What really matters is whether people have a
choice, and whether they are able to express their views in the polls. Do they have a secret ballot and do they have a choice, not just where they vote but also where they live? If so, then you'll know whether it is a true outcome or whether it's a forced state of affairs.

FP: So are you saying that if people don't like it here, they should just leave the country?

LHL: No, I'm saying, just look and see: Are people leaving the country, or are people queuing up to come in? If you look at our immigration statistics, lots of people are eager to move here. We have 20,000 to 30,000 permanent residents a year-new ones. We only have 45,000 babies born a year. So in the final analysis, is Singapore a place where people are happy to live? That's the case today. And if you want to make sure that you don't stagnate or end up in a cul-de-sac with no path forward, then you have to make sure you remain relevant and bring in new people who are able to command the respect of a new generation. And that's what we have been trying to do. In the last election, one of the reasons we did so well was because we were able to get 25-odd new candidates who impressed Singaporeans that they were not our boys. So it's a democratic system. You are in power, but you have no tenure. And there is no guarantee that in ten years' time, or even in five years' time, the picture will be the same.
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