Southeast
Asia
Al-Qaeda's footholds
A comparison of two ladies and the contrasting
ways they handle the terrorist threat by Singapore Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew in April 1 edition of Forbes magazine
Mar 26, 2002
By Lee Kuan Yew
Sept.
11, 2001, changed the fortunes of Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In its aftermath she accepted the U.S.
military's help in training her forces to fight terrorism
and the al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf terrorists.
The prospects for her country have now improved.
For Indonesia's President Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sept. 11
was a setback. Since taking office that July, she had been
restoring confidence and hope to Indonesians.
Soon after Sept. 11, Megawati met with President Bush in
Washington and took a strong anti-terrorist stand.
Unfortunately, in the two weeks she was away, two aggressive
groups of Muslim militants, Laskar Jihad and the Islamic
Defenders Front, captured world media headlines by staging
fierce anti-U.S. demonstrations in Jakarta and by threatening
American tourists in Solo.
By the time Megawati returned, the Muslim militants had
seized and set the agenda.
The vast majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderates.
They know that if the militants prevail, a diverse and pluralistic
Indonesia will break apart.
But to win Muslim votes in the 2004 elections, many political
leaders oppose taking any action against these militants.
When al-Qaeda became big news after Sept. 11, a Singaporean
Muslim informed Singapore's Internal Security Department
(ISD) that Muhammad Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan, a Singaporean
of Pakistani descent, had links with al-Qaeda.
The ISD immediately put him and his associates under surveillance.
On Oct. 4, Aslam left suddenly for Afghanistan.
The police did not stop him because they were hot on the
trail of his associates. On Nov. 29, a foreign intelligence
agency told the ISD that a Singaporean named Aslam had been
detained by the Northern Alliance.
Before the story leaked widely and Aslam's associates could
abscond, ISD arrested 15 of them. Interrogation and examination
of their computer hard disks and video compact discs revealed
they were targeting U.S. assets in Singapore.
Thirteen of those arrested are members of Jemaah Islamiah
(JI), a terrorist network based in Indonesia that spans
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.
After
the arrests a friendly intelligence agency gave the ISD
a videotape found in the Afghanistan home of Muhammad Atef,
Osama bin Laden's second-in-command, who was reportedly
killed in air strikes outside of Kabul.
This videotape is of Singapore's Yishun subway station and
the shuttle buses that ferry U.S. military personnel to
it; it is accompanied by a running commentary, in English,
by one of the arrested plotters:
"This is a taxi stand [where] our bicycle [packed with
explosives] can be parked. The [U.S.] military personnel
will alight from the bus or queue up for the bus. That is
a temple ... where many vehicles [are] parked so it will
not be suspicious to have a motorcycle or a bicycle there."
The
ISD information enabled Philippine intelligence in Manila
to arrest Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian and key
al-Qaeda member operating from the Philippines. He is one
of two foreign handlers of the Singapore JI cells.
A bombmaker, he had in his possession more than a ton of
TNT, hundreds of detonators and more than a mile of detonating
cord. The other foreign handler, a Canadian national of
Kuwaiti descent, is still at large.
Yazid
Sufaat, a Malaysian and another important al-Qaeda-linked
operative, had already obtained and stored 4 tons of ammonium
nitrate in a Malaysian town 100 miles north of Singapore.
Sufaat had housed two of the Sept. 11 bombers in Kuala Lumpur
when they were en route to America for the attacks. The
two handlers asked the Singaporeans to purchase another
17 tons of nitrate, bringing the total to 21 tons, for seven
bombs -- each the size of the Oklahoma City bomb.
When all was ready, the two handlers were to assemble seven
truck bombs and direct where they were to be placed and
detonated simultaneously. (They knew that after one explosion,
security would be tightened.)
he arrests of the Singapore cells thwarted the handlers'
plans, which, had they succeeded, would have caused many
American and Singaporean casualties and horrendous damage.
These
Muslim terrorists operate across national boundaries like
multinational companies.
The two al-Qaeda handlers taught the Singaporeans how to
avoid detection and maintain secrecy, using code names,
multiple aliases, pay phones and prepaid mobile-phone cards.
Without the handlers, the Singaporeans would not have known
how to devise, let alone execute, such an audacious plan.
Malaysia
and Singapore accused Abu Bakar Baasyir, the leader of the
Indonesian Mujahideen Council in Indonesia, of leading JI
in both territories.
Baasyir denied involvement in JI. Baasyir's Indonesian subordinate,
Hambali, wanted by Malaysia and Singapore for directing
terror groups in both countries, is now missing.
No
Safe Havens in Southeast Asia
If the
U.S. had not destroyed al-Qaeda's Afghan bases and scattered
its leaders, its terror networks would have grown and penetrated
deep into Southeast Asia, reaching the numbers and level
of sophistication achieved in the Middle East, Europe and
America.
Al-Qaeda needs new safe havens to regroup. If it finds them
in Southeast Asia, it will certainly resume its attacks
on U.S. assets targeted earlier: U.S. embassies in the region
and military personnel, naval vessels and aircraft going
through Singapore. This we cannot allow.
Lee Kuan Yew
